LEARN FROM THE PAST—ARM THE AFGHANS[1]
President Obama’s long awaited strategy for Afghanistan rests on three premises: That victory in Afghanistan is fundamental to U.S. National Security because we must deprive Al Qaeda of that operating base; that defeating the Taliban requires a significant build-up of U.S. Forces; and that in addition to establishing security, the U.S. must create good governance by “fixing” the government in Kabul, making it more effective, less corrupt and able to extend its influence into the provinces. All three premises are incorrect.
Defeating Al Qaeda is not matter of geography and driving its leaders out of Afghanistan, assuming we can, will not make us safe. To think otherwise means to not understand asymmetrical warfare. This is a large and messy planet; there will always be some chaotic corner where terrorists can set up camp. Their message has to stop resonating, potential recruits have to lose interest, communities have to turn against them, and their ideology has to fade into obscurity. That, and not control of geographic terrain is what being safe looks like.
(To be continued on December 26, 2009)
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